5 players Thomas Tuchel ignored who could have solved his England 'DNA' problem at the World Cup

England's World Cup ended in Atlanta with a 2-1 semifinal defeat to Argentina that has prompted something of an inquest back home.

Anthony Gordon's goal undone by late strikes from Enzo Fernandez and Lionel Messi's assist for Lautaro Martinez, after England dropped deeper and deeper and finished the game with 12% possession in the final stretch.

Head coach Thomas Tuchel was widely criticised for his substitutions and tactics at 1-0, with England going all-out defence and inviting pressure from their opponents. Tuchel responded by suggesting England lack the profile of player that could have led to a different outcome, or allowed him to make alternative changes.

Is he right?

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What did Thomas Tuchel mean by England's 'DNA' problem?

"It's maybe not in our DNA like it is in the Spanish DNA or Argentinian-Brazilian DNA, to take the ball and control the game with the ball," Tuchel said after the match, calling it "a big problem." He went further on the specifics: "We couldn't find any duels anymore, that's why we dropped deeper and deeper... [we] couldn't stop the runners from second line, the midfielders, through our gaps."

Tuchel's argument is that England lack the players capable of taking control of the game in such circumstances, which is a criticism that has been levelled at the national team for some years now. The problem is, he left plenty of that kind of player at home — or on the bench.

Is it really in England's DNA, or did Tuchel's own selection and substitutions take away the tools to control the game? It seems to be a bit of both, but certainly, there are options Tuchel ignored.

— OptaJoe (@OptaJoe) July 17, 2026

The players who could have solved Tuchel's DNA problem

There are four options for England's midfield who could have made a difference, none of which were included in Tuchel's final World Cup squad.

The data below is based on the 2025/26 club season.

Phil Foden

The best pure passer of this group by overall accuracy, completing 88.6% of his attempts at 48.59 passes per 90, with 79.9% accuracy on his passes into the final third, second only to Lewis-Skelly. He looks like the clearest passing solution to "control the game with the ball," even if his club role hasn't asked much of him physically.

Cole Palmer

The most progressive ball-carrier of the four, averaging 3.3 progressive runs per 90, nearly double Foden's rate. His overall pass accuracy, 82.6%, sits in the middle of the pack. Fitness was clearly the bigger factor in his World Cup omission, since his underlying numbers, when fit, hold up well against this brief.

Morgan Gibbs-White

His 18 goals this season make the wider case for involving him somewhere, and his passing numbers, 83.6% accuracy and 4.64 passes into the final third per 90, are solid without standing out. Less obviously a control-the-game specialist than the others, but still a player who was watching from home.

PlayerPass accuracyProgressive runs /90Passes to final third /90

Phil Foden	88.6%	1.83	4.24
Cole Palmer	82.6%	3.30	4.02
Morgan Gibbs-White	83.6%	2.07	4.64
Myles Lewis-Skelly	90.1%	1.70	5.63

Kobbie Mainoo

There is also the case of Kobbe Mainoo, who undercuts the personnel argument the most directly. He wasn't left out of the squad, and he still didn't play a single minute across England's seven matches, an unused substitute every time, including when Rice came off in Atlanta.

His club numbers make that the hardest omission to explain: a 90.9% pass completion rate, the highest of this entire group of five, and at the highest volume (51.01 passes per 90), plus the most accurate passing into the final third (85.2%). He also posts the best defensive duel win rate of the group, 64.6%, and 3.19 interceptions per 90, exactly the kind of ball-retention-plus-defensive-work profile that could have replaced Rice like-for-like, instead of the switch to a sixth defender that actually happened.

PlayerPass accuracyInterceptions /90Passes to final third /90Defensive duels won

Kobbie Mainoo	90.9%	3.19	5.88	64.6%

Figures from Mainoo's 2025/26 club season.

Was Thomas Tuchel right?

Look at how the game actually ended and the "DNA" explanation gets harder to accept. In the 82nd minute, with England still ahead, Tuchel took off Declan Rice, his only real ball-winning presence in central midfield, and replaced him with a defender, Nico O'Reilly, pushed into a makeshift wing role. Reece James came off for another centre-back, Dan Burn, at the same time. By the closing stages, England had six defenders on the pitch.

That's not a personnel shortage, it's a choice. Rather than replacing Rice with a midfielder who could keep the ball moving and still compete physically, Jude Bellingham was left to do that job increasingly alone, while Mainoo, an out-and-out passing and duel-relevant option, stayed on the bench the entire match. If England couldn't win duels or keep the ball in the final half hour, it's at least partly because Tuchel built a team shape in that moment that had fewer midfielders on the pitch, not more.

Rice was always coming off at some point given his recent illness and injury issues, and Jordan Henderson, the more natural player to replace him like-for-like, wasn't available due to a freak injury. But that didn't mean the next man in had to be another centre-back.

James could have shifted inside into midfield instead of making way for Burn, with Ezri Konsa holding the right side of the defence as he already was, and Bukayo Saka and Marcus Rashford stretching the pitch from the wings. If the plan really was to sit in a low block and see the game out, Mainoo was the option built for exactly that job. Keeping the ball under pressure is what he does best.

There's a separate question worth asking here, too. Once Gordon's goal went in, it was England who dropped into a low block, not Argentina, sitting deeper and deeper and inviting the pressure that eventually broke them down. In that situation, calm possession alone doesn't get you out from deep; someone still has to be able to beat a man and carry the ball through pressure individually to relieve it. That's a different skill set to the passing-and-duels profile Tuchel was describing, and it points to a different kind of name than the ones already covered here.

Myles Lewis-Skelly is mostly a left-back by trade — 34 of his 46 appearances last season came there — but he's featured in deeper central midfield roles, too, and his underlying numbers suggest a genuine carrying threat: a 60.6% successful dribble rate, a strong 56.4% win rate in offensive duels, and 90.1% pass accuracy at high volume, 43.84 passes per 90. He wasn't picked, either.

Data via Wyscout