A year after coming into power, Syria’s ruler faces his defining test in Lebanon

Since Ahmed al-Sharaa came to power in Damascus last January, a question has hovered in the air: Has Syria truly changed, or merely changed hands?

Seeking sanctions relief, investment and a measure of international legitimacy, the new leadership, despite its past association with Al Qaeda, has signaled moderation.

The symbols of the old regime are gone. The suffocating omnipresence of the Assad state has receded. Cafes have reopened, checkpoints have thinned and Syrians speak more freely.

Yes, there have been killings of members of the Druze and the formerly dominant Alawite minorities, which the government denies direct involvement in.

But even this mixed picture is no small achievement. The Russia- and Iran-backed Assad regime was not simply authoritarian; it was claustrophobic, built on surveillance, coercion and inherited power. Its collapse created space.

Now, with war raging in Iran and President Trump eager for geopolitical wins, matters are coming to a head, and a big decision beckons.

It involves the Lebanese militia Hezbollah — the most powerful non-state armed force in the Middle East and the crown jewel of Iran’s regional jihadi-exporting project.

Assad turned Syria into a transit route for weapons, fighters and funds headed to Hezbollah. In return, Hezbollah helped Assad fight the rebellion from which the current leadership emerged. 

What is driving the urgency is the war with Iran, and the attempt by both Israel and the United States to translate battlefield momentum into a durable shift in the regional balance.

Hezbollah entered the current confrontation by firing on Israel in solidarity with Tehran. That decision has brought the group into direct conflict not only with Israel but into the strategic crosshairs of Washington. 

Israel fought another round against Hezbollah, weakening it significantly, in 2024 in the array of conflicts that erupted after Hamas – another Iranian proxy – massacred some 1,200 people in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. It’s no longer interested in temporary deterrence but wants Hezbollah disarmed.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun is also eager to free his country of Hezbollah, and has called on it to disarm — but his own military is too weak.

That is where al-Sharaa comes in. According to multiple accounts, Washington wants a spectrum of actions from him: at a minimum, sealing the Syrian-Lebanese border to prevent the flow of weapons and fighters; beyond that, potentially deploying forces along or even across the eastern frontier to pressure Hezbollah’s positions and cut its strategic depth. 

It would put Syria on the side of Israel — with which the al-Sharaa government has already helped security-coordination talks. If Hezbollah is disarmed, there is a French proposal on the table for talks that might lead to some version of peace between Lebanon and Israel — and perhaps even Syria. It’s big.

So the convergence of the Iran war, the broader fighting that emerged after the Oct. 7 massacre and American political urgency is bringing matters to a head — and placing al-Sharaa at the center of it.

He’s being asked to signal that Syria has not merely disentangled itself from Iran and Russia, but is actively repositioning toward the West.

That carries risks. The memory of Syria’s long domination of Lebanon still lingers, making any cross-border involvement politically explosive. Damascus has moved cautiously — deploying forces to its own border, signaling defensive intent, and avoiding any overt commitment.

But Syria cannot indefinitely occupy the middle ground it now inhabits. It seeks investment, reconstruction and a decisive, visible path out of isolation. The United States has already begun to ease sanctions. But the price of full normalization will be strategic clarity. Hezbollah is where that clarity will be tested.

This will impact the critical question of a return of Syrian refugees. About 6.8 million — roughly a third of the pre-war population — fled during the decade-plus of civil war.

The hope was that Assad’s fall would trigger a wave of refugees heading home.

That hope was especially profound in Europe, with the mass of Middle Eastern migrants of recent years has fuelled the rise of far-right movements and is endangering the cohesiveness of the European Union.

According to estimates, almost a million refugees have gone back, many of them from Jordan and Lebanon. But the overwhelming majority of the millions who reached Europe have not.

Security is surely part of the reason — but there is also something simpler. Until real investment arrives, the economy will not recover. Jobs are scarce. Services are unreliable. For a Syrian who has built even a precarious life in Germany, Turkey or the Gulf, and is contemplating a return, the numbers do not add up.

Many migrants, realistically, have no intention of going back. Migration from the Middle East and Africa to Europe is often one-directional. There is simply no comparing the quality of life.

And that loops directly back to geopolitics. Without a clear break from the alliances and behaviors of the past, an attractive economic future will remain out of reach.

So, 16 months after the fall of Assad, Syria stands at an inflection point. The old order is gone, but the new one is not yet fully defined.

Al-Sharaa says he represents something different. Now he’s being asked to prove it.

Dan Perry is the former London-based Europe-Africa editor and Cairo-based Middle East editor of the Associated Press.